The advent of more powerful processors in the early 2000’s started the computing revolution that led to what we now call the cloud. With single hardware instances able to run dozens, if not hundreds of virtual machines concurrently, businesses could offer their users multiple services and applications that would otherwise have been financially impractical, if not impossible.
But virtual machines (VMs) have several downsides. Often, an entire virtualised operating system is overkill for many applications, and although very much more malleable, scalable, and agile than a fleet of bare-metal servers, VMs still require significantly more memory and processing power, and are less agile than the next evolution of this type of technology – containers. In addition to being more easily scaled (up or down, according to demand), containerised applications consist of only the necessary parts of an application and its supporting dependencies. Therefore apps based on micro-services tend to be lighter and more easily configurable.
Virtual machines exhibit the same security issues that affect their bare-metal counterparts, and to some extent, container security issues reflect those of their component parts: a mySQL bug in a specific version of the upstream application will affect containerised versions too. With regards to VMs, bare metal installs, and containers, cybersecurity concerns and activities are very similar. But container deployments and their tooling bring specific security challenges to those charged with running apps and services, whether manually piecing together applications with choice containers, or running in production with orchestration at scale.
Container-specific security risks
- Misconfiguration: Complex applications are made up of multiple containers, and misconfiguration – often only a single line in a .yaml file, can grant unnecessary privileges and increase the attack surface. For example, although it’s not trivial for an attacker to gain root access to the host machine from a container, it’s still a too-common practice to run Docker as root, with no user namespace remapping, for example.
- Vulnerable container images: In 2022, Sysdig found over 1,600 images identified as malicious in Docker Hub, in addition to many containers stored in the repo with hard-coded cloud credentials, ssh keys, and NPM tokens. The process of pulling images from public registries is opaque, and the convenience of container deployment (plus pressure on developers to produce results, fast) can mean that apps can easily be constructed with inherently insecure, or even malicious components.
- Orchestration layers: For larger projects, orchestration tools such as Kubernetes can increase the attack surface, usually due to misconfiguration and high levels of complexity. A 2022 survey from D2iQ found that only 42% of applications running on Kubernetes made it into production – down in part to the difficulty of administering large clusters and a steep learning curve.
According to Ari Weil at Akamai, “Kubernetes is mature, but most companies and developers don’t realise how complex […] it can be until they’re actually at scale.”
Container security with machine learning
The specific challenges of container security can be addressed using machine learning algorithms trained on observing the components of an application when it’s ‘running clean.’ By creating a baseline of normal behaviour, machine learning can identify anomalies that could indicate potential threats from unusual traffic, unauthorised changes to configuration, odd user access patterns, and unexpected system calls.
ML-based container security platforms can scan image repositories and compare each against databases of known vulnerabilities and issues. Scans can be automatically triggered and scheduled, helping prevent the addition of harmful elements during development and in production. Auto-generated audit reports can be tracked against standard benchmarks, or an organisation can set its own security standards – useful in environments where highly-sensitive data is processed.
The connectivity between specialist container security functions and orchestration software means that suspected containers can be isolated or closed immediately, insecure permissions revoked, and user access suspended. With API connections to local firewalls and VPN endpoints, entire environments or subnets can be isolated, or traffic stopped at network borders.
Final word
Machine learning can reduce the risk of data breach in containerised environments by working on several levels. Anomaly detection, asset scanning, and flagging potential misconfiguration are all possible, plus any degree of automated alerting or amelioration are relatively simple to enact.
The transformative possibilities of container-based apps can be approached without the security issues that have stopped some from exploring, developing, and running microservice-based applications. The advantages of cloud-native technologies can be won without compromising existing security standards, even in high-risk sectors.